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A Model of Aggregate Reporting Quality
Abstract
We characterize ﬁrms’ aggregate reporting quality in an economy where a rational capital mar-
ket as well as a regulator discipline ﬁrms’ reporting choices. When the regulator is resource
constrained, multiple aggregate reporting choices are possible in equilibrium. This multiplicity
is driven not just by the regulatory constraint, but also by how this constraint interacts with
managerial incentives and the level of reporting discretion available to ﬁrms. These results
obtain despite ﬁrms trying to signal their type through private voluntary activities such as
dividends. This link between aggregate reporting and aggregate signaling activities is under-
emphasized in the literature. The model’s results thus oﬀer a way to jointly interpret empirical
results on aggregate reporting, aggregate signaling, and underlying institutions.
A Model of Aggregate Reporting Quality
1 Introduction
The role of underlying legal and regulatory institutions in determining aggregate prop-
erties of accounting reports is a vital subject of accounting research. This research has
documented variation in aggregate accounting patterns that still elude explanations. For
example, Ball et al. (2000, Figure 1) documents that countries with similar legal ori-
gin have diﬀerent accounting properties. Likewise, Dechow et al. 2010 (Sections 4 and
5) review the empirical earnings literature, and note that the links between reporting
quality and the underlying institutions are only partly understood. Theoretical account-
ing literature has developed models of aggregate accounting properties, but the main
economic force tying all ﬁrms together in these models are production factors such as
exogenous CAPM-like correlations among the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows (e.g., Leuz et al. 2007;
Strobl 2013). This study develops a theoretical model of aggregate reporting choices
where the main economic force tying all the ﬁrms together is regulation. As a result,
the model speaks directly to the role of legal institutions in driving reporting choices.
As a ﬁrst step, we introduce a capital market economy with both “good” and “bad”
ﬁrms whose reporting choices are overseen by a central regulator. Firms in this economy
are run by managers who have an interest in the stock price, and have reporting discretion
over the assessed value of their ﬁrms’ assets. The regulator investigates ﬁrms and forces
any misreporting manager to publicly correct his disclosures and pay a penalty. However,
the regulator has limited resources and cannot investigate all ﬁrms’ reporting choices
(Becker 1968).1 Investors then price all the ﬁrms rationally, taking into account the
possibility that the regulator may have missed some misreporting ﬁrms.
1Becker’s model appears to be especially relevant in the recent deregulatory era where regulators
had been curtailed substantially (e.g., our Exhibit 1; Rajan 2005; Akerlof and Shiller (2009, Ch. 3)).
Labaton (2008b) documents that the S.E.C.’s oﬃce set up to oversee the use of complex securities in
the $4 trillion banking industry had not had a director and, as of September 2008, had not completed
a single inspection in the last year and a half.
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Managers in our model maximize share price less the expected penalty for misre-
porting. Reporting choices aﬀect both the share price and the expected penalties. As
more ﬁrms choose to misreport, the less likely it is that a given ﬁrm will be caught by
the regulator. On the other hand, the stock price beneﬁt to over-reporting also changes
with the number of misreporting ﬁrms in the economy, because investors are rational.
Thus, for individual managers, both the share price beneﬁt and the regulatory penalty
costs of misreporting vary with misreporting prevalence in the economy. This feature
leads to multiple reporting equilibria in our model.
To the extent the reporting equilibrium allows “bad” ﬁrms to mimic the “good”
ﬁrms in our economy, the good ﬁrms would like to separate from the bad ﬁrms through
signaling activities such as dividend payments. As good ﬁrms choose to diﬀerentiate
in this manner and opt out of the reporting game, the combination of the regulatory
oversight eﬀects and the investor valuation eﬀects on the remaining ﬁrms causes their
values to change in a non-monotonic manner. Multiplicity in the subsequent reporting
choices can thus still obtain.2
Investors in our model are rational; therefore prices are always correct on average,
regardless of the equilibrium level of aggregate misreporting. The true real eﬀect mani-
fests itself in the sensitivity of prices to new information: when aggregate misreporting
levels are high, new information does not get into prices eﬃciently. This phenomenon
has important welfare implications because prices’ ability to aggregate dispersed private
information eﬃciently is what makes them key drivers of real resource allocation in a
free market economy (e.g., Hayek 1945). This crucial allocation mechanism of capital
markets is impaired in the “bad” equilibrium where many ﬁrms misreport.
The above welfare result makes it important to understand the conditions under
2Our model diﬀers from studies such as Povel et al. (2007) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002),
where the cost of detecting misbehavior in a given ﬁrm is an exogenously speciﬁed parameter. In our
model, the strength of the regulatory force on any ﬁrm is endogenous, and depends on the reporting
behavior of other ﬁrms. Consequently, the aggregate level of misreporting in Povel et al. (2007) depends
on the ex ante investor bullishness about the economy, whereas the same initial conditions in our model
can generate diﬀerent aggregate misreporting levels.
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which such multiplicity obtains. The conditions in our model are: constrained regula-
tors, the presence of reporting discretion, and strong stock-based incentives for managers.
These factors have been widely implicated in the systematic shift from disciplined bal-
ance sheets to overvalued balance sheets in the U.S. banking industry in the period
leading up to the mortgage crisis (e.g., Blinder 2013, Ch. 3; Donaldson et al. 2008;
Kouwe 2009; Labaton 2008a; Mollenkamp et al. 2008). In such situations, our model
therefore suggests that empirical studies may not be able to uniquely map reporting
institutions to reporting quality, no matter how carefully researchers construct their
empirical measures (e.g., Ball et al. 2000, Figure 1).
Our reporting results hold even when “good” ﬁrms credibly signal their way out of
the reporting game. To the extent one can think of dividends as such a signal, our model
speaks to aggregate dividend patterns, which are a well-analyzed but partly-understood
phenomenon (Fama and French 2001). Recent empirical research suggests earnings are
a important factor (Skinner 2008). Our model suggests another important factor over
and above earnings, namely the nature of the entire ﬁnancial reporting regime itself.
This link, to the best of our knowledge, has not been demonstrated before, despite the
fact that signals and ﬁnancial reporting serve the same aggregate purpose: to separate
good ﬁrms from bad.
The externality in our model arises from constrained regulatory resources. How-
ever, it is well understood in economics that congestion eﬀects in deterrence can by
themselves drive multiplicity in a traditional crime setting: i.e., a low crime level is a
deterrence in itself, because the lone criminal knows that the police have ample spare
resources to catch him. However, this line of reasoning has not been extensively used to
understand aggregate ﬁnancial reporting patterns in the empirical accounting literature,
in part because, in addition to regulation, one has to account for additional disciplin-
ing mechanisms such as rational pricing in capital markets and managerial incentives.
The value of our model is that it shows how these additional disciplining mechanisms
change the nature of deterrence congestion. As a result, our model is better suited to
3
explain aggregate empirical patterns of ﬁnancial reporting choices than a pure crime and
deterrence model.
Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 develops the model. Section 4 computes
the equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The traditional focus of misreporting models has been on single-ﬁrm misreporting (Strobl
2013, p. 452). An important step towards multi-ﬁrm reporting was taken by Leuz et al.
(2007), who “unpacked” the CAPM by rewriting returns in terms of future cash ﬂows,
and introduced accounting as signals of these future cash ﬂows. Subsequent studies such
as Strobl (2013) built on Leuz et al. (2007) by allowing managers to manipulate these
accounting signals. The key feature tying all the ﬁrms together is CAPM’s exogenous
correlation among the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows, which drives both misreporting and investor
pricing. Likewise, in Povel et al. (2007), investors’ ex ante level of bullishness about the
economy drives the aggregate level of misreporting.
A common feature of all the above models is that the cost of detecting misreporting
is exogenously held constant. For example, the cost of detecting reporting fraud in
Povel et al. (2007, p. 1229) is a constant m per ﬁrm. We relax this assumption,
and, following Becker (1968), assume that public enforcers have ﬁnite ﬁxed resources
and cannot evaluate every potential violation.3 Consequently, as more actors engage
in violations, enforcers will run out of resources to detect, convict, and punish these
malefactors. This enforcement thinning feature of Becker has not received suﬃcient
attention, even in studies that apply Becker’s idea to ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Shleifer
and Wolfenzon (2002)).
Our model generates multiplicities in equilibrium, so we oﬀer a brief review of the
literature. Interest in multiplicities arose in ﬁnancial economics research from a desire
3For theories of the existence and importance of a public regulator, see Rajan and Zingales (2004,
Ch. 7) and Shleifer (2005).
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to model excess volatility relative to fundamentals. Multiplicities imply that the same
fundamentals can yield diﬀerent outcomes, and this extra variation in outcomes is rep-
resentative of excess volatility relative to fundamentals (e.g., Angeletos and Werning
2006). We ﬁrst start a mathematical discussion of multiplicities and then show the vari-
ous institutional settings to which prior economic models have applied this mathematics.
In their economics text, Mas-Colell et al. (2005, Section 17.D) note that, “For a
theorist, the best possible worlds is one in which the social situation being analyzed ...
is parsimonious ... and manages to predict a unique outcome.” They then go on to
explain the mathematical theory of intersection of manifolds and show that unless one is
willing to impose very strong geometric restrictions on the problem, multiplicity of ﬁxed
points is likely.4 Angeletos and Werning (2006) demonstrate this point by showing how
geometrically relaxing the global games formulation removes the unique robust Nash
equilibrium and introduces multiplicities: in fact, echoing Mas-Colell et al., Angeletos
and Werning (2006) show that previous authors who had obtained uniqueness in global
games settings had been considering only a limiting case of a much more general problem.
To date, papers exploring multiplicity in ﬁnancial markets have largely focused on
non-convexities in trading activities. Angeletos and Werning (2006) show that price
signals improve information coordination among ﬁnancially constrained traders, and that
this information externality can lead to multiple equilibria. Barlevy and Veronesi (2003)
show that a market with informed and uninformed traders can have price multiplicities
due to the uninformed traders’ backward bending demand curve: higher prices lead
uninformed traders to infer higher fundamentals and demand more of the stock. 5
A central feature of all the above papers is that they impose various exogenous re-
4Uniqueness of ﬁxed points is primarily a consequence of geometric assumptions and reﬁnements
such as convexity, which models of multiplicity relax (Cooper 1998). Even the simplest competitive
2-consumer 2-good competitive exchange equilibrium in an Edgeworth box admits multiplicity unless
one makes speciﬁc geometric reﬁnements such as “gross substitutes” utility functions (Mas-Colell et al.
1995, Section 17.D).
5The traders in these models are rational. Separately, note that behavioral trading patterns such
as positional heuristics or herding, if present in a large measure, can also cause multiplicity and excess
volatility in prices.
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strictions on individual trading behavior: individual traders in Angeletos and Werning
(2006) do not have enough resources to attack the asset, while individual arbitrageurs
in Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) face ﬁnancial constraints that limit their stock holding
and maximum short positions. Traders’ limited resources force them to coordinate, and
this collective action externality, in conjunction with information asymmetry, leads to
multiplicities and excess volatility in prices. From our perspective, however, the key in-
stitutional feature of these papers is that the asset characteristics themselves are taken
as given. As a result, regulatory institutions have little role to play. The externality
in our model occurs in a diﬀerent part of the economy, namely the legal institutions
supporting management disclosures. In fact, traders in our model are ﬁnancially un-
constrained and rational, which eliminates both trading externalities and the ensuing
multiplicities in price dynamics.6
3 Model
We lay out the model and then motivate the various assumptions. We ﬁrst model an
economy of “good” and “bad” ﬁrms, where the bad ﬁrms can mimic the good ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial reports. We then solve this reporting game. We then backwards induct to a
prior-period signaling game where the good ﬁrms can credibly signal their type and thus
separate or opt out of the reporting game. We will show that not all good ﬁrms always
will always want to opt out, and the bad ﬁrms will sometimes mimic the reports of the
remaining good ﬁrms. Multiplicity of outcomes is possible in both games.
3.1 The layout of the reporting game model
We assume an economy of N > 0 independent ﬁrms run by independent managers.
These ﬁrms operate in a capital market with rational risk-neutral price-taking investors
6Rajan (2005) discusses both information and regulation. Our incremental contribution is to show
with an explicit analytical model how rational investors and regulation interact.
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0 1 2 2 2 3 3
Managers learn
the true value of
their ﬁrms
Managers issue a
report of the value
Regulator
inspects some
ﬁrms
Regulator
discloses some
misreporting
ﬁrms and
imposes
penalties on
managers
Some ﬁrms
remain
undetected
Investors price
the ﬁrms
Managers
collect payoﬀs
Figure 1: Timeline of Events in the Reporting Game
and a regulator. N1 ﬁrms have a true valuation of 1, and N0 = N − N1 ﬁrms have a
true valuation of 0.7 This information is common knowledge. At Time 0 each manager
learns the true value of his ﬁrm. Investors and the regulator are still uninformed. At
time 1 all managers report the value of their ﬁrms. They have discretion to report either
1 or 0. At Time 2, the regulator investigates the ﬁrms for misreporting. It penalizes
any manager who is caught misreporting, and forces him to publicly issue a restatement,
which investors learn about.8 At Time 3, the investors price all the disclosures, and the
managers are paid oﬀ. Speciﬁcally, they get compensated on the stock price less any
levied penalties for misreporting. Figure 1 provides a time-line.
Each manager’s stock price interest in the ﬁrm is α > 0.9 A manager of a 0 value
ﬁrm who reports 1 without being caught makes α times the price of the ﬁrm in Time
3. A manager of a 0 value ﬁrm who reports 1 and subsequently is caught makes −c in
Time 3 because the regulator levies the penalty, and investors drive the stock price of
that ﬁrm to zero. A manager who truthfully reports 0 makes 0 in Time 3.
The 0 manager who reports 1 at Time 1 therefore computes his expected payoﬀ at
Time 3 as follows: α times expected Time 3 stock price less the expected penalty c
multiplied by the probability of being caught for misreporting in Time 2.
Note that α > 0 guarantees that no manager will misreport “down”. The only
possibility is the true value of 0 being misreported as 1. All parties understand this, and
7See Aghion and Bolton (1992) for a model of the ﬁrm whose value has binary support.
8The regulator does not disclose the identity of the ﬁrms that were inspected but did not misreport.
9One possible interpretation of α is the manager’s ownership share.
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the regulator will focus its attention exclusively on ﬁrms that report 1.
We next discuss the regulatory action at Time 2. The regulator has K > 0 dollars in
resources, and does not know in advance which of the ﬁrms reporting 1 are misreporting.
Investigating each ﬁrm is assumed to cost the regulator one dollar; so the regulator can
investigate at most K ﬁrms.10 Since all ﬁrms reporting 1 are indistinguishable from
each other, the regulator chooses randomly among ﬁrms that report 1. We assume
that the regulator makes no errors in the investigation process (Schwartz 1997). Each
investigation will therefore reveal the true value of the ﬁrm. Therefore, the only way
for a misreporting ﬁrm to avoid getting caught is if the regulator never got around to
investigating it in the ﬁrst place.11 The manager of the caught ﬁrm is personally ﬁned
c > 0. Investors learn about it in Time 3 and drive that ﬁrm’s stock price to its true
value of zero.
The extensive form of the game is portrayed in Figure 2.
10Section 3.2 motivates this assumption.
11We assume that K < N ; otherwise we have uninteresting case that the regulator checks all ﬁrms
and ensures truthful reporting throughout the economy.
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N ﬁrms
N1 ﬁrms have
value 1
Report 1
Price is
equation (1)
N0 ﬁrms have
value 0
M ﬁrms
report 1
K
N1+M
M ﬁrms
get caught
Price is 0
Managers pay −c
(
1− K
N1+M
)
M ﬁrms
go free
Price is
equation (1)
N0 −M ﬁrms
report 0
Price is 0
Figure 2: Payoﬀ Tree in the Reporting Game. M , the number of 0 value ﬁrms reporting 1,
is endogenous, All other variables are exogenous. N is the total number of ﬁrms. N1 is the
number of ﬁrms with value 1, and N0 the number of ﬁrms with value 0. K is the number of
ﬁrms examined by the regulator. c is the misreporting penalty, if assessed. The above tree is
valid for equilibria where M+N1 > K. The only feasible equilibrium value for M not satisfying
this inequality is 0. In that case, no 0 value ﬁrm lies, and investors price all reports at face
value.
Suppose M out of N0 of the 0 value ﬁrms misreport 1. Our goal is to characterize
the properties of M . First, note that the total number of ﬁrms reporting 1 is N1 +M .
The regulator can investigate K of these ﬁrms. If K > N1 +M in equilibrium, all M
ﬁrms will be caught for sure. So the only possibility is M = 0. Therefore, if M > 0 in
9
equilibrium, it has to be also true that the endogenous M satisﬁes K < N1 + M . In
that case, M K
N1+M
misreporting ﬁrms will get caught, and the rest will go undetected.
The prices thus depend on whether the equilibrium M = 0 or the equilibrium M
satisﬁes K < N1 +M . We describe this process next. Investors know N1, so they can
check the number of ﬁrms reporting 1 to assess if equilibrium M > 0 or not. If the
equilibrium M = 0, investors price a report of 0 as 0 and a report of 1 as 1. If the
equilibrium M > 0, then K < N1 +M , and investors know that M(1 − KN1+M ) of the
ﬁrms reporting 1 are worth zero. So they will price a report of 1 as:
N1
N1 +M − KMN1+M
(1)
Note that an equilibrium M > 0 must also satisfy K < N1+M , causing the price in
equation (1) to be the range (0, 1). In sum, in the equilibrium case M > 0, the manager
of a 0 value ﬁrm who reports 1 at Time 1 computes the following as his expected payoﬀ
in Time 3:
(
1− K
N1 +M
)
α
N1
N1 +M − KMN1+M
+
(
K
N1 +M
)
(−c) (2)
We can divide the manager’s net payoﬀ by α. We denote the scaled penalty as
C ≡ c
α
. So the expected scaled payoﬀ for a manager of a 0 value ﬁrm to reporting 1 is:
(
1− K
N1 +M
)
N1
N1 +M − KMN1+M
+
(
K
N1 +M
)
(−C) (3)
On the other hand, a manager who reports 0 is always valued as 0 because managers
have no incentives to report down (we will discuss this point later in Section 4). The
scaling therefore applies to this manager as well.
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3.2 Motivating the reporting model’s assumptions
We ﬁrst discuss the valuation process. The binary valuation model we use has a rich
precedence in the ﬁnance literature (see Hart (1995, Ch.6) and Aghion and Bolton
(1992)). This model is ﬂexible enough to accommodate the needed reporting and regu-
latory actions in the front end while retaining a tractable model of investor valuation at
the back end. In addition, the results generated by binary models have clear intuition
that likely extends beyond these models.
In valuing a ﬁrm, investors pay attention to the outcome of the regulator’s activities.
The binary valuation model considerably simpliﬁes our modeling of the regulator. Be-
cause the only misreporting possible is 0 being misreported as 1, the rational regulator
need only scan the 1 ﬁrms. In addition, all 1 ﬁrms are otherwise indistinguishable. So
the rational regulator can randomly pick K of them (at most). Additionally, since the
ﬁrms are i.i.d, the regulator learns nothing about an unexamined ﬁrm from the exam-
ined ones. So we can assume that each ﬁrm costs the same to scan. This simple model
of regulation is tractable, while reﬂecting Becker’s (1968) idea of constrained regulation
(also see Exhibit 1 of this study).
Rajan and Zingales (2004, Ch. 7) and Shleifer (2005) oﬀer theories on the existence
and importance of a public regulator. We therefore exogenously assume the existence of
a public regulator. Most economies also supplement the public regulator with private
auditors. The force of these auditors is zero in our model, but one could imagine adding
a private cost of misreporting (Fischer and Verrecchia (2000)), which in our case would
add an additional negative constant to equation (2). However, as we will show in the
next section, a constant shift in the payoﬀ structure does not in any way disturb the
geometric structure of the model: we currently intersect a curve with the x-axis, and
we just have to shift the x-axis up to accommodate the negative constant. This changes
the computation of the exact intersection points but does not change the intuition. We
therefore assume the private cost of misreporting to be zero.
Finally, our modeling of the manager incentives is standard in the accounting liter-
11
ature.
4 Equilibrium in the reporting game
Figure 2 shows that both the costs and beneﬁts of misreporting vary with the num-
ber of misreporters. This can lead to multiple ﬁxed points or equilibrium number of
misreporters, as the following proposition makes explicit (the proof is in the Appendix):
Proposition 1 1. If N1 ≤ KC then there is a unique equilibrium where no 0 value
ﬁrm reports its value as 1. All ﬁrms thus report truthfully.
2. If N1 > KC then there are three cases to consider. Deﬁne:
M ≡ K
2
+
K
2
√
1 +
4N1C
N1 −KC −N1 (4)
(a) If M ≥ N0 then no 0 value ﬁrm reports its value as 1. All ﬁrms thus report
truthfully.
(b) If 0 ≤M < N0 there are three equilibria:
i. No 0 value ﬁrm reports its value as 1. That is, all ﬁrms report truthfully.
ii. Exactly M 0 value ﬁrms report their values as 1 (and the others report
0).
iii. All 0 value ﬁrms report their values as 1.
(c) If M < 0 then there is a unique equilibrium where all 0 value ﬁrms report
their value as 1.
First, note that N1 is common knowledge. Therefore, by examining the number
of ﬁrms reporting 1, everyone can ascertain the realized equilibrium in the multiple
equilibrium case. Second, recall that K is the number of ﬁrms that the regulator can
scan, and C is the penalty that the regulator imposes on a manager. KC can thus
be viewed as a measure of regulatory strength. Intuitively, one would expect that all
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0 value ﬁrms will misreport when regulatory costs are low, no ﬁrms will misreport
when regulatory costs are high, and multiplicity may arise when regulatory forces are
moderate. What Proposition 1 does is to quantify these thresholds precisely.12
The ﬁrst criterion that prevents misreporting is if N1 < KC, where N1 is the number
of ﬁrms truthfully reporting 1 (see Figure 2). However, as Proposition 1 shows, this is
not necessarily the tightest threshold. That is, if KC = (N1 − ) where  is a very small
positive number, M in equation (4) can be very large and uniqueness can still obtain.
Only when M ∈ (0, N0) does multiplicity obtain.
On the opposite side, when C becomes very small, M ≈ K −N1 in equation (4). If
K > N1, then M > 0 and multiplicity is still possible. To see this, consider the case
where no 0 value ﬁrm misreports. If one 0 value ﬁrm misreports, the regulator will catch
that ﬁrm (K > N1) and assess the penalty C. This is suﬃcient to make no misreporting
an equilibrium. The multiplicity thus depends onM in equation (4) in the manner that
Proposition 1 makes precise.
An important assumption in the proof is that when all ﬁrms report 1, the investors’
oﬀ-equilibrium path belief is that a report of 0 means it is a 0 ﬁrm. We show that this
belief satisﬁes the intuitive criterion, a commonly-used criterion to assess the reason-
ableness of oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs (Kreps 1990, Section 12.7.4). The intuitive criterion
requires that if for all oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of investors upon receiving the report 0, a
1 ﬁrm (or a 0 ﬁrm) does strictly worse than its current reporting of 1, then the only
allowable oﬀ-equilibrium investor belief upon receiving 0 is that the ﬁrm is a 0 ﬁrm (or
a 1 ﬁrm). However, a 0 ﬁrm cannot do strictly worse: consider the case when investors
value a report of 0 at 1; then a 0 ﬁrm pays no penalty and earns 1 for telling the truth,
which is more than it earns now. If a similar dominance criterion fails to apply to the
1 ﬁrm as well (e.g., when investors believe a report of 0 means 1, and a 1 ﬁrm makes
more by reporting 0 (net of regulatory penalties) than it is making now), the intuitive
criterion is then trivially satisﬁed. Otherwise, the only admissible possibility is that
12We separate the N1 ≤ KC case explicitly from M ≥ N0 case because M could be complex or
undeﬁned when N1 ≤ KC.
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investors value a report of 0 at 0. Our investors’ oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs thus satisfy the
intuitive criterion.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of all the three possibilities. The multiplicity hap-
pens when C is at a moderate level (C = 1 in the example). This three-solution case
has two corner solutions – no 0 value ﬁrm misreports and all 0 value ﬁrms misreport.
The results follow the well-known properties of multiple equilibrium models (see Section
2.12 and 6.14 of Romer (1996)). In particular, the two corner or end solutions are sta-
ble. When every 0 value ﬁrm misreports, misreporting pays more than zero, ensuring
stability. When no 0 value ﬁrm misreports, misreporting pays less than zero, ensuring
stability. The interior or middle solution by, contrast, is not stable. If a few 0 value ﬁrms
reporting 0 were to deviate to misreporting 1, the payoﬀs from misreporting rise for all
0 value ﬁrms, providing an incentive for every 0 value ﬁrm to misreport. One could
therefore conjecture that when C is moderate, the most likely equilibria are all 0 value
ﬁrms reporting 0, or all 0 value ﬁrms reporting 1. However, the model of multiplicity
itself cannot specify which equilibrium the economy really picks (Romer (1996, Sections
2.12 and 6.14)). However, we can still compare the two equilibria on certain attributes
and investigate how the parameters of the model need to change to make the preferred
equilibrium more likely. This point is explored further in Section 4.2.
Figure 3 also makes clear why an additional constant private cost of misreporting
would not aﬀect the intuition of the results. As of now, the payoﬀ from misreporting
is compared to the payoﬀ from reporting 0, which is 0, i.e., the x-axis. If misreporting
carries an additional constant penalty F , the comparison of the curves will not be with
the x-axis in Figure 3, but with the x-axis raised by F . This complicates the computation
of the M but does not change the geometric intuition of multiple intersections.
To see this more clearly, consider the corner equilibrium point where all 0 value ﬁrms
misreport. It is easy to visualize in Figure 3 a raised horizontal line that is below the
curve C = 0.02 for some range of M , but ends up above the curve when M reaches
its maximum value. In this case, all 0 value ﬁrms reporting 1 is not an equilibrium:
14
C = 0.02
C = 1
C = 2
200 400 600 800
M
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
Expected Benefits to Misreporting
Figure 3: Expected payoﬀs of equation (3) to misreporting 0 as 1 as a function of M, the
number of misreporting ﬁrms. N1 = 150, N0 = 850,K = 100. There are thus 150 ﬁrms with
value 1 and 850 ﬁrms with value 0. The equilibrium number of misreporting ﬁrms M ∈ [0, 850].
If C = 0.02, all 0 value ﬁrms misreport. If C = 2, no 0 value ﬁrms misreport. If C = 1, there
are three equilibria: all 0 value ﬁrms misreport, or no 0 value ﬁrms misreport, or 80.27 of the
850 ﬁrms misreport.
what is happening is that the capital market and regulatory net beneﬁts when all 0
value ﬁrms misreport are too low for each misreporting ﬁrm relative to its private cost
F to misreporting. The precise locations of the equilibrium points thus change with the
introduction of private misreporting costs, but multiple intersections are still very much
possible.
Finally, we demonstrate the presence of multiplicity in a pure deterrence congestion
eﬀect. In a pure crime and punishment model, the gross beneﬁts of crime do not directly
depend on the congestion eﬀect, but the probability of getting caught does. To mimic
that situation, suppose the beneﬁts of misreporting are constant, i.e., investors (irra-
tionally) value a 1 reports at some constant I and a 0 report at 0, and do not change
their valuations subsequently. That is, the gross beneﬁts of crime and honesty to a 0
ﬁrm are I and 0 respectively. Equation (3) would then become:
I − KC
N1 +M
(5)
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This equation is monotonically increasing in M and will therefore yield at most one
intersection with the x-axis. If such an intersection obtains, both M = 0 and M = N0
are stable equilibria in a manner similar to Figure 3. However, the factors driving this
multiplicity and the resulting comparative statics will be very diﬀerent in that case,
compared to the setting where there is an additional capital market force. We illustrate
this fact next.
4.1 Signaling by the “good” firms prior to the reporting game
The model thus far allows for strategic action only by the 0 ﬁrms (and the regulator); the
1 ﬁrms are just bystanders. However, the equilibrium in Proposition 1 suggests that 1
ﬁrms would want to separate from the 0 ﬁrms, if possible, and receive higher valuations.
We now extend the model where 1 ﬁrms can credibly signal their type. In particular,
we insert a signaling game prior to the reporting game to allow 1 ﬁrms to separate out.
The separation of 1 ﬁrms can be eﬀected in several ways: 1) an investor could collect
information about the ﬁrm and trade on it (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980), or 2) stock
price incentives for management of “good” ﬁrms drive these ﬁrms to engage in costly
signaling activities such as dividend payments or building excess capacity. Investors
are risk-neutral and are price-takers in our setting; in case 1) such an investor will
trade inﬁnite amounts and drive the Walrasian price to his private information estimate,
thus losing his information advantage. To avoid this outcome, models with a positive
cost of information acquisition typically assume non-linearity either in form of investor
risk-aversion or investor pricing power. For simplicity and tractability, but without
compromising on the intuition, we model case 2), assuming an exogenous signaling
technology that costs 0 < s < 1 and credibly reveals ﬁrm value. Only 1 ﬁrms will choose
to employ this signaling technology (0 ﬁrms have no resources to pay s). In addition,
we allow the 1 ﬁrms to signal before the reporting game. As a result, the regulator also
observes these signals and, being rational, does not investigate the signaling ﬁrms. In
other words, by paying s, any 1 ﬁrm can opt out of the reporting game and receive a sure
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valuation of 1− s. We investigate how this opt-out possibility changes the equilibrium.
The signaling game thus works as follows: in the ﬁrst stage, all 1 ﬁrms simultaneously
decide whether to signal or not (0 ﬁrms have no resources to pay the s signaling fee).
Then, all ﬁrms who do not signal enter the reporting game. We now compute the Nash
equilibrium for the signaling game, taking into account the equilibrium we have already
derived for the reporting game.
Recall that N0 is the intial number of 0 ﬁrms, and N1 is the initial number of 1
ﬁrms. We wish to compute how many of the N1 ﬁrms will opt out, and how many will
remain in the reporting game. As a ﬁrst backwards induction step, we compute the ex
ante expected payoﬀ to a 1 ﬁrm for choosing to stay in the reporting game. The only
diﬃculty arises in Case 2(b) of Proposition 1, where there are three possible equilibria.
The middle equilibrium, as discussed in the previous section, is unstable. So, we assume
that the ex ante belief is that the two corner equilibria can occur with equal probability
1
2
.13 We can then use Proposition 1 to write the ex ante value to a 1 ﬁrm for choosing
to stay in the reporting game as (  is the indicator function that is one in the region
denoted by its subscript and zero otherwise):
 N1≤KC1+ N1>KC
[
 M≥N01 +  0≤M<N0
(
1
2
+
1
2
N1
N1 +N0 − KN0N1+N0
)
+  M<0
N1
N1 +N0 − KN0N1+N0
]
(6)
For example, the ﬁrst term  N1≤KC1 indicates that when N1 ≤ KC, the reporting
payoﬀ to a 1 ﬁrm is 1. This is Part 1 of Proposition 1. The other terms of equation (6)
follow the subsequent parts of Proposition 1.
The payoﬀ in equation (6) is plotted in Figure 4. Also plotted is the payoﬀ 1 − s
that a 1 ﬁrm receives for opting out by signaling. This amount is independent of the
number of ﬁrms, so it is a constant. The optimal number of 1 ﬁrms choosing to opt out
depends on nature of the intersections of the two payoﬀ functions.
13Our reasoning goes through with other strictly positive probability distributions as well.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium ex ante expected payoﬀ to a 1 ﬁrm in the reporting game as in equation
(6) as a function of N1, the number of 1 ﬁrms. N0 = 1500,K = 350, C = 2.
The key strategic players in the reporting game are the 0 ﬁrms, who switch their
strategies at precise thresholds. This naturally leads to discontinuities in the ex ante
expected payoﬀs to the 1 ﬁrms in equation (6) and Figure 4. Given these discontinuities,
a geometric analysis is far more intuitive and approachable than an analytical one. We
use Figure 4 as a guide, but we ﬁrst illustrate several observations from the ﬁgure that
are universal and not dependent on the speciﬁc parameters chosen in the ﬁgure. Once
these observations are made, we can work with the ﬁgure in manner that is both intuitive
and rigorous.
First, we note that here are two discontinuities separating the three regions delineated
in Proposition 1. To identify these discontinuities, note that Equation (4) shows that
M = +∞ when N1 = KC, and M = −∞ when N1 = ∞, and that M is continuously
decreasing in N1. So we can think of M as a function of N1, and represent N1 by the
inverse function M−1. The N1 where the ﬁrst discontinuity happens is therefore:
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N1A =M
−1(N0) > KC (7)
N1A > KC by the intermediate value theorem. The value of N1 where the second
discontinuity happens is:
N1B =M
−1(0) >M−1(N0) = N1A (8)
The discontinuities in the ex ante expected payoﬀs to the 1 ﬁrms for choosing to stay
in the reporting game are also evident from equation (6) and Figure 4. As we cross N1A
from left to right in Figure 4, the payoﬀ drops from 1 to a smaller value (we know from
the proof of Proposition 1 that K < N1 +N0 in this region):
1 >
1
2
+
1
2
N1A
N1A +N0 − KN0N1A+N0
(9)
Likewise, there is a discontinuous drop in payoﬀs as well when we cross N1B from
left to right in Figure 4 (we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that K < N1 +N0 in
this region):
1
2
+
1
2
N1B
N1B +N0 − KN0N1B+N0
>
(
1
2
+
1
2
)(
N1B
N1B +N0 − KN0N1B+N0
)
(10)
We can now use Figure 4 to compute the Nash equilibrium in the signaling game.
In particular, for any initial N1, we compute the equilibrium number of 1 ﬁrms who
signal and opt out of the reporting game, and the number of 1 ﬁrms who remain in the
subsequent reporting game, with all choices being made simultaneously. Note that the
signaling ﬁrms are all 1 ﬁrms, so we just refer to them as “ﬁrms”.
Consider Figure 4. If N1, the initial number of 1 ﬁrms pre opt-outs, is such that the
original equilibrium is at point A, then point A is itself a stable equilibrium: no 1 ﬁrm
will want to individually ex-ante opt out of the reporting game and earn the strictly less
amount 1 − s. Subsequently, in this region, the reporting game exhibits multiplicities.
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In this situation, therefore, the ability to opt out does not remove multiplicities in the
reporting game.14
On the other hand, if the initial N1 is such that the payoﬀ is slightly below A
′, ﬁrms
will begin opting out: the ex ante payoﬀ to staying in the reporting game is less than
the opt-out payoﬀ of 1 − s. The above opt-out cascade ends at A′′. We next show how
the cascade ends in an opt out equilibrium.
By its deﬁnition in equation (7), N1A, the x-coordinate of A
′′, will not be an integer
with probability one. Let N1A	 be the largest integer smaller than N1A.15 One possible
Nash equilibrium is as follows: let all ﬁrms be rank ordered by their publicly known
CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Security Identiﬁcation Procedures).16 Firms with rank
order greater than N1A	 opt out and earn 1 − s. The remaining N1A	 ﬁrms stay in
and earn 1. Given everyone else’s choices, none of these latter ﬁrms will opt out, for
then the opting out ﬁrm will earn 1 − s < 1. Likewise, none of the former set of ﬁrms
opting out will choose to stay in, for if one such ﬁrm does so, the number of ﬁrms in the
reporting game will beN1A	 + 1 > N1A. The entry of one ﬁrm therefore will move the
payoﬀ to the reporting game to the point right of A′′ (and to the left of A′) and thus
cause that ﬁrm to earn less than 1 − s, the initial payoﬀ to opting out. Thus no ﬁrm
will individually deviate, and the equilibrium is Nash.17
The geometric way to think about the opting out behavior is to examine the payoﬀ
curve with the 1 − s line. If the payoﬀ curve is initially above the 1 − s line, then no
14We will show the existence of reporting multiplicities even when the reporting payoﬀ at the initial
N1 is below 1− s.
15We assume that the exogenous parameters are such that N1A	 > 0.
16There are N1! such possible rank orderings of the ﬁrms. The equilibrium we compute works for
any such ordering.
17We assume that exogenous values of the parameters are such that payoﬀ of equation (6) at the
integer value N1A	 is greater than 1− s. That is, integers exist in the support of the region between 0
and A′′ and the region between A′′ and A′. Also note that the payoﬀ term N1
N1+N0− KN0N1+N0
in equation
(6) is not monotonic in N1, the number of 1 ﬁrms: increasing N1 increases the base line probability
that any ﬁrm is a 1-ﬁrm, but it also decreases the probability that a misreporting 0-ﬁrm is detected.
Investor valuation of a report of 1 balances both these eﬀects. This non-monotonocity of the payoﬀ
curve can yield additional intersections with the 1 − s line, and assuming existence of integers in the
support, similar Nash equilibria can be computed for all intersections. Finally, we recognize that we
have not shown the uniqueness of our pure Nash equilibrium (modulo the ordering sequence).
20
ﬁrm will opt out. If the payoﬀ curve is initially below the 1 − s line, ﬁrms will start
opting out, till the payoﬀ curve “intersects” the 1 − s line. The Nash equilibria we
formulated above make the notion of intersection precise in terms of integer supports.
More important, the ending point can either be in the unique reporting regime or the
multiple reporting regime. The ability to opt out decreases, but does not eliminate, the
possibility of multiplicity.
The reporting equilbirium with N1A	 1 ﬁrms is unique. This may suggest that
reporting multiplicity holds only when signaling is costly, i.e., 1 − s is too small. But
this is not the case. If the initial number of 1 ﬁrms in Figure 4 is larger than N1B, and
thus each ﬁrm expects a payoﬀ less than 1−s, ﬁrms will begin to opt out till the number
of ﬁrms in the reporting game is N1B	 (assuming integer support exists in the region
from A′ to B′′′). This is a Nash equilbrium, because following the same argument as
above, no individual ﬁrm will want to deviate. Also note that this equilibrium leads to
multiplicities in the reporting game.18 The ability to opt out thus reduces, but does not
eliminate, the possibility of reporting multiplicity.
In our model, therefore, prices both reﬂect and guide costly real decisions such as
costly signaling, an idea that has had a rich history in the ﬁnance literature (see Bond
et al. (2012)). To see the impact of the pricing process, note that the opt-out behavior
can be very diﬀerent in a pure congestion game where only the penalties, not the gross
beneﬁts of crime are typically subject to the congestion eﬀect. For example, in equation
(5), the payoﬀ to reporting 1 is a constant I. If I > 1− s, no 1 ﬁrm will opt out. If I <
1−s, all 1 ﬁrms will opt out. This is an outcome substantially diﬀerent from our results,
suggesting that the equilibrium opt-out behavior and the resulting reporting game in our
model is not a matter of pure congestion eﬀect; it also matters how the capital market
payoﬀs interact with the regulatory congestion. These two forces together determine the
18N1B	 is not the unique Nash equilibrium in Figure 4, because the 1−s line intersects the reporting
payoﬀ curve thrice. Again following the same argument as above, N1A	 is also a Nash equilibrium in
that no single ﬁrm will individually deviate. The latter Nash equilibrium at N1A	 would not obtain if
the 1− s line in Figure 4 was slightly below A′′, because, in that case, the 1− s line would intersect the
reporting payoﬀ curve only once, not thrice.
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conﬁguration of the payoﬀ function in Figure 4 and the resulting intersection points with
1− s. We next discuss the implications of our model, where the advantages of explicitly
modeling capital market beneﬁts along with congestion costs become even clearer.
4.2 Comparative statics
We ﬁrst discuss the implications for the reporting game. We know that multiplicities
can occur in the reporting regime. A model of multiplicity cannot predict which of the
equilibria the economy will attain. However, comparative statics are still useful if we can
compare the equilibrium points on certain attributes and establish what criteria make
those equilibria more likely. In our setting, diﬀerent equilibrium points have diﬀerent
welfare properties, even though investors price rationally at every equilibrium point. To
see this, ﬁrst note from equation (3) that investors price 0 as 0, but 1 as N1
N1+M− KMN1+M
,
where M is the number of misreporters. We can show that (proof in Appendix):
Lemma 1 The valuation N1
N1+M− KMN1+M
is lower when the equilibrium level of M is higher.
Investors thus do not react as much to a report of 1 when the equilibrium number
of misreporters is high. In fact, the sensitivity of the price to earnings is maximum
when M = 0, i.e., no ﬁrm misreports. Prices then take the reports at face value, and
thus fully reﬂect the information available to managers. In contrast, when M is bigger,
the price system does not respond as much to the earnings reports and thus does a
poorer job of aggregating information in the economy.19 It has been long known that
such a price system cannot eﬀectively direct the allocation of resources in a capitalistic
economy (Hayek 1945). So even though the model cannot determine which equilibrium
the economy will take, it is important to understand the conditions under which a “good”
equilibrium is more likely.20
19Dechow et al. (2010, Section 4.1) review the empirical research on cross-country variations in price
response to earnings.
20We do not explicitly model, other than the costly opt-out signaling choice, resource allocation
distortions due to uninformative prices. The extensive ﬁnance literature on how prices both reﬂect and
guide real investment is surveyed in Bond et al. (2012). Also see Gao and Liang (2012). One pricing
feature we cannot speak to is cost of capital, because our investors are risk-neutral.
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Figure 4 shows that no 0 ﬁrm will misreport if N1 < N1A. One way to achieve this
outcome is to make the signaling opt-out option more viable. For example, it has been
shown that changing dividend taxes changes the propensity of ﬁrms to pay dividends
(Chetty and Saez 2005; Hanlon and Hoopes 2013).21 Of course, no improvement comes
for free, and from a welfare perspective, the resource allocation beneﬁts of informative
prices have to be compared with the welfare losses arising from the extensive use of costly
signaling techniques in the economy. Our model does not conduct this exercise; what we
view as our model’s contribution instead is that it shows how costs of ex ante signaling
activities aﬀect the equilibrium level of reporting quality and the resulting information
asymmetry in the subsequent reporting game.
Another way to change the reporting game outcome is to increase regulatory re-
sources. For example, note from equation (4) that M is increasing in K and C. Conse-
quently, a further observation is that as the misreporting penalty C increases, the points
of discontinuity move to the right in Figure 4. A similar movement happens when the
regulatory budget K increases; in addition, −K is in the denominator of the payoﬀ
amount in equation (6), so the expected payoﬀ to the 1 ﬁrms for choosing to stay in
the reporting game also increases. It is in this global sense that increasing regulatory
strength improves the valuation of the good ﬁrms, thereby increasing price sensitivity
to earnings reports.
Increasing K has the standard interpretation of increasing regulatory resources. But
increasing C has more interpretations than just increasing the penalties if caught. Recall
from equations (2) and (3) that C ≡ c
α
. Decreasing α can therefore increase C as well.
One interpretation of α is the sensitivity of the manager’s total compensation to the
stock price. Another possible interpretation is reporting discretion. That is, one can
think of equation (2) as representing an economy where the binary payoﬀs are {α, 0}.
An economy with smaller α can thus also be viewed as an economy where managers
have less reporting discretion.
21One can think of the payment of the dividend tax to the government as a cost that the ﬁrm’s
owners incur for choosing to employ this signal.
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However, note from Proposition 1 that the reporting equilibrium always has no 0 ﬁrms
misreporting or all 0 ﬁrms misreporting. Furthermore, the switches in the number of
equilibrium ﬁxed points happens only whenM crosses any of its two discrete thresholds.
However, for any given random values of the exogenous parameters, the value of M is
almost always strictly away from these two thresholds, implying:
Observation 1 Because either all 0 ﬁrms or no 0 ﬁrms misreport in our equilibrium,
small changes in regulatory resources or incentive regimes will almost always cause no
change in the number of misreporting ﬁrms. However, when changes do happen, they
will be typically be large changes in the number of misreporting ﬁrms.22 Similarly, a
small change in signaling costs either causes no change, or causes a large change in both
the number of signaling and misreporting ﬁrms (e.g., when a small change in 1−s causes
the initial point to move from above the 1− s line to below the 1− s line in Figure 4).
More subtly, equation (6) indicates that increasing K raises the ex ante expected
payoﬀs to the 1 ﬁrms in Figure 4, and increasing K or C shifts the location of discon-
tinuities to the right, which also (weakly) raises the ex ante payoﬀs. This increase in
the ex ante expected payoﬀs to 1 ﬁrms choosing to enter the reporting game renders the
1− s exit option (weakly) less proﬁtable, implying that, in this context, one can consider
the regulatory resources and signaling option as substitutes.
Some of the observations above do not explicitly rely on the multiplicity of ﬁxed
points. A signiﬁcant comparative statics diﬀerence between unique equilibrium models
and multiplicity models is that temporary shocks to exogenous variables in a multiplicity
model can stably shift the economy from one equilibrium to another (Matsuyama 2005).
This can be seen in our model as well. In Figure 4, if the economy is initially at A, a
temporary change in 1−s can potentially be used to drive the economy to the point where
only N1A “good” ﬁrms remain in the reporting game. However, this new equilibrium
22This observation will not always be true when there is a private cost of misreporting, because
one can then obtain an interior equilibrium in the number of 0 ﬁrms misreporting. See the discussion
following Figure 3.
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continues to remain viable when 1− s is returned back to its original value. Of course,
a rigorous analysis of this process would require a full-ﬂedged dynamic model, which is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we just state as a conjecture:
Conjecture 1 A temporary change in signal beneﬁts 1 − s or regulatory resources K
and C can lead to permanent changes in the initial signaling and the resulting reporting
equilibrium.
4.3 Empirical implications
The above results speak to ﬁndings on cross-country empirical work on accounting qual-
ity. Initial work such as Ball et al. (2000) examined the impact of broader institutional
factors such as legal origins on a country’s accounting quality and found that similar in-
stitutions support diﬀerent levels of accounting quality (see their Figure 1). Such results
are consistent with reporting multiplicities predicted by our model. Subsequent empir-
ical studies expanded the set of institutions considerably (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003). Our
model suggests that interactions among various institutions factors is a natural area for
further empirical work. For example, Burghstahler et al. (2006) examine the interactive
eﬀects of institutions and public capital markets on earnings management. Our model
provides speciﬁc theoretical guidance for such empirical work on interactive eﬀects, by
showing how credible signaling activities, regulatory resources, and managerial compen-
sation schemes together impact reporting quality. In particular, Observation 1 suggests
that empirical research on institutional drivers of reporting quality may not discover
any eﬀects unless there is large variation in these drivers. There might thus be more
empirical power in smaller settings, e.g., where a given country faced a large change in
its institutions. Our model thus provides several empirical paths forward, despite the
presence of multiplicities.
One potential signaling technique that is viewed as costly and credible, and thus
relevant to our model, is dividend payments. Consistent with Observation 1, the U.S.
has seen substantial shifts in aggregate dividend patterns over time, both in the number
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of dividend payers and the aggregate dividends paid (Fama and French 2001). Several
explanations have been advanced for this ﬁndings, a particular salient one being the
emergence of repurchases as a factor that changes the costs and beneﬁts of dividend
signaling. This explanation could be viewed as changes in 1− s changing the number of
signalers in our model. In addition, Skinner (2008) provides descriptive evidence that
the level of reported earnings is associated propensity to pay dividends. What our model
suggests is that the entire reporting regime plays a signiﬁcant role in aggregate signaling
activities. This linkage could be worthy of further empirical investigation.
The ﬁndings of our model apply to empirical studies of individual ﬁrms as well.
Speciﬁcally, our model highlights the importance of accounting for the contemporane-
ous activities of other ﬁrms. For example, Karpoﬀ et al. (2008) empirically document
the penalties to managers caught for misreporting. Our model suggests that the Karpoﬀ
et al. (2008) study could be extended to incorporate economy-wide factors such as reg-
ulatory resources, discretion in reporting rules, and estimates of the ex ante probability
of being caught. Such empirical investigations have been undertaken by studies such
as Huizinga and Laeven (2012), who recognize that the reporting choices of individual
banks during the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis took into account the reporting choices of other
banks as well as the constraints faced by the banking regulators.
Finally, Conjecture 1 provides a policy-related suggestion as well. Much of the cur-
rent policy debate has centered around the idea of strengthening regulation and curbing
managerial incentives (e.g., Kashyap and Stein 2008; Blinder 2009; Department of Trea-
sury 2009). However, the political support for such permanent regulatory expansion
plans is typically far from uniﬁed (e.g., Wyatt 2010). A temporary expansion of reg-
ulatory oversight is more feasible politically, and according to our model, likely to be
eﬀective in shifting the reporting equilibrium. Likewise, Figure 4 shows that a tempo-
rary change in cost-beneﬁts of dividend signaling (perhaps via a temporary dividend
tax change) can have a permanent eﬀect on reporting quality. Chetty and Saez (2005)
and Hanlon and Hoopes (2013) show how the initiation and expiry of divided tax regime
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changed dividend payouts. What our model suggests (and this remains to be empirically
tested) is that such temporary dividend tax changes could permanently change ﬁnancial
reporting quality.
5 Conclusion
This study builds a model where management incentives, rational traders, and regula-
tory constraints contribute to create an economy capable of multiplicities in aggregate
reporting behavior. From an empirical perspective, this is an important theoretical re-
sult for two reasons. First, even after holding key institutional features constant, the
reporting quality across similar countries shows high variation (e.g., Ball et al. 2000). A
model of reporting multiplicities is a useful way of thinking about these cross-sectional
phenomena. Second, the model also speaks to the time-series variation in reporting in
the same country. For example, the widespread belief in the pre-crisis period in the
US was that aggregate misreporting of balance sheets could not occur in rational cap-
ital markets, and any departure from this axiomatic belief (e.g., Rajan 2005) was met
with considerable skepticism by mainstream economists (e.g., Knight 2005). Our model
shows how these beliefs might be proven wrong. More important, our model shows that
some of these outcomes have welfare implications in that new information fails to reach
prices, substantially impairing the primary mechanism through which a free market
system directs the allocation of its real resources.
A interesting feature of our model is that “good” ﬁrms can credibly signal their type
with a costly signal and opt out of the reporting game. We show how this possibility
changes, but does not eliminate, multiplicities. More interestingly, if one thinks of
dividends as a credible signal, our model shows how the regulatory reporting regime links
both aggregate dividend policies and reporting choices. This linkage, which demonstrates
another way in which prices guide real costly decisions, could be of considerable empirical
interest.
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This study’s approach to modeling reporting phenomena at the economy-wide level is
a considerable departure from the traditional accounting analytical models that explore
reporting choices in a single ﬁrm. The key tradeoﬀ we make is to simplify the analytical
treatment of each individual ﬁrm in order to aggregate the model at the economy-wide
level. Such tradeoﬀs are necessary because single-ﬁrm models have limited relevance
to the exploding empirical literature on reporting phenomena at the country-level (see
Section 4 in Dechow et al.’s (2010) review). Simplifying individual-ﬁrm phenomena
to speak to the aggregate is thus an important and increasingly necessary analytical
endeavor (e.g., Nagar and Yu 2014).
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The fundamental intuition behind the proof is present in Figure
2 which shows that both the beneﬁts and the costs of misreporting varies with the number of
misreporters. This can lead to multiple ﬁxed points in the number of misreporters. However,
as we will see, in order to identify these ﬁxed points, one has to ennumerate a fair number of
cases.
The net beneﬁts to misreporters is a quadratic function, which we compare to 0 because our
maintained assumption throughout the paper is that investors will always value a report of 0
at 0 (even when no ﬁrm reports 0 in equilibrium). In comparing a quadratic equation to zero,
several cases arise because a quadratic equation can be convex or concave, and may not have
real roots, and we have to check for all possibilities.
Recall that all exogenous constants N0, N1, N ≡ N0 +N1,K,C are strictly positive and K <
N ≡ N0 +N1.
The endogenous variable is M , where M is the number of the N0 0 value ﬁrms that report
1 in equilibrium. That is, a total of M + N1 ﬁrms report 1. Our goal is to characterize the
equilibrium value of M . Speciﬁcally, we want to fully specify when M takes a corner solution
and when M takes an interior solution.
Note that we also have to make sure that any solution M > 0 satisﬁes K < N1 +M . This
condition ensures that all probabilities and prices are positive in equation (11) below. In that
case, M 0 value ﬁrms report 1, of which KMN1+M get caught, and investors lump the remaining
M − KMN1+M with the N1 ﬁrms that are truly worth 1, resulting in a price of N1N1+M− KMN1+M for
ﬁrms that report 1. The ex ante payoﬀ to the manager of a 0 value ﬁrm to reporting 1 is:
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(
1− K
N1 +M
)(
N1
N1 +M − KMN1+M
)
+
K
N1 +M
(0−C) (11)
Note on Notation: It is easier to couch the equation (11) in terms of x where x = N1 +M
is the total number of ﬁrms reporting 1. Our proof will largely use x, but occasionally for ease
of exposition, we will use M . Note, however, that there is only one endogenous variable, and
x and M are its two representations.
The payoﬀ to the manager of a 0 ﬁrm from reporting 1 is:
(
1− K
x
)(
N1
x− K(x−N1)x
)
+
K
x
(−C) (12)
(x−K)N1
x2 −Kx+KN1 −
KC
x
(13)
x2(N1 −KC)− xK(N1 −KC)−KN1KC
(x2 −Kx+KN1)x (14)
In equilibrium, this payoﬀ has to be ≥ 0. We therefore have to examine both the numerator
and the denominator of equation (14).
We ﬁrst note the following observations:
Observation 2 The denominator of the fraction in equation (14) is positive when x > K > 0
because x2 −Kx+KN1 is positive when x > K > 0.
We next consider the case when x < K.
Observation 3 If x < K in equilibrium, the regulator can inspect all ﬁrms reporting 1. No 0
ﬁrm will report 1 in that case and the equilibrium M = 0. Also note that equation (11) is no
longer valid.
We ﬁrst attempt to ascertain the conditions under which an interior equilibrium solution M
obtains. Such an equilibrium should satisfy:
1. 0 < M < N0
2. K < N1 +M
3.
(
1− KN1+M
)(
N1
N1+M− KMN1+M
)
+ KN1+M (−C) = 0
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The ﬁrst condition is interiority. The second condition is that the regulator does not have
enough resources to catch all misreporting ﬁrms (otherwise the equilibrium is M = 0). The
third condition is that misreporting 1 should have the same ex ante payoﬀ for a 0 ﬁrm as
truthfully reporting 0.
Rewriting the equilibrium in terms of the endogenous variable x (the total number of ﬁrms
reporting 1) the feasibility conditions become N1 < x < N ≡ N0 + N1 and K < x. The
equilibrium condition becomes:
x2(N1 −KC)− xK(N1 −KC)−KN1KC
(x2 −Kx+KN1)x = 0 (15)
We have not yet proved the existence of an interior equilibrium point, but should such an
equilibrium exist, Observation 3 applies, and we can only consider solutions for x > K. This
implies that Observation 2 applies and the denominator in equation (15) is strictly greater
than zero in an interior equilibrium (if any); we can thus clear the denominator.
We can therefore simply solve the numerator quadratic equation below to get the interior
solution (if any):
x2(N1 −KC)− xK(N1 −KC)−KN1KC = 0 (16)
We next investigate whether the numerator quadratic equation (16) has a solution x > K.
The roots are:
K
2
± K
2
√
1 +
4N1C
N1 −KC (17)
The roots of the above equation determine where there is an interior solution. However, note
that interior solution is not the only possible solution. There are two corner solutions as well:
all 0 value ﬁrms misreport (x = N) or no 0 value ﬁrms misreport (x = N1). We have to check
the feasibility of all these possibilities. We ﬁrst begin with the following observation:
Observation 4 When N1 − KC > 0 equation (16) is a convex upward facing parabola in
x (the second derivative with respect to x is positive). It also has two real roots because it
is negative at x = 0. The parabola is negative between the these roots, and positive outside.
By the same token, when N1 − KC < 0, the parabola is downward facing and concave. The
parabola has either two real roots or no real roots. If it has two real roots, it is positive between
these two roots and negative outside. If it has no real roots, it is negative always (checked by
evaluating the quadratic at zero). Finally, if N1 − KC = 0, the quadratic is always negative
with value −KN1KC.
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We now analyze all the possible solutions (interior and corner) for all the cases.
1. Case when N1 ≤ KC:
If N1 ≤ KC then one can see from equation (17) that an interior solution greater than K is
not possible: either the real roots are less than K or there are no roots. So we have excluded
the interior solution. We now check for possible corner solutions. For this we need to examine
the following cases:
1a. Case N1 ≤ KC with real roots:
We show that the corner equilibrium x = N > K cannot happen. Such an x is greater than
both roots. Observation 4 tells us that the numerator quadratic of equation (15) is negative.
Observation 2 tells us that the denominator of equation (15) is positive. It does not pay for
any 0 ﬁrm to report 1; it is better to report 0 and gain 0. The optimal is therefore the corner
solution M = 0; all ﬁrms report truthfully.
1b. Case N1 ≤ KC with no real roots:
If there are no real roots, Observation 4 tells us the numerator quadratic in equation (15) is
always less than zero for all x, and thus for all x > K, including the corner value x = N > K.
This negativity condition also holds if N1 = KC. Furthermore, Observation 2 yields a positive
denominator. A 0 value ﬁrm is therefore always better oﬀ reporting 0 and M = 0.
The only equilibrium again is all ﬁrms reporting truthfully. This proves the ﬁrst part of
Proposition 1.
2. Case when N1 > KC:
If N1 > KC, we have two real roots:
x∗ ≡ K
2
+
K
2
√
1 +
4N1C
N1 −KC >
K
2
+
K
2
= K (18)
x∗ ≡ K
2
− K
2
√
1 +
4N1C
N1 −KC <
K
2
− K
2
= 0 (19)
The ﬁrst root thus satisﬁes x∗ > K, and by extension Observation 2. However, we cannot state
that the interior equilibrium M = x∗ −N1 because we still do not know if 0 < x∗ −N1 < N0.
We must check this by hand for the given values of the exogenous variables. But we ﬁrst
establish a simple lemma on the numerator quadratic (equation 16) based on Observation 4:
Lemma 2 If N1 > KC, the quadratic equation (16), x
2(N1−KC)−xK(N1−KC)−KN1KC,
in x crosses zero with a positive slope at x∗, and remains above zero for all x > x∗.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating x2(N1−KC)−xK(N1−KC)−KN1KC with respect to x and evaluated
at x∗ gives us:
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2x∗(N1 −KC)−K(N1 −KC) = (2x∗ −K)(N1 −KC) > 0
The positive sign obtains because x∗ > K (this, as proved above, is a consequence ofN1 > KC).
Since x∗ is the larger root, and the parabola is convex (the coeﬃcient (N1 − KC) on x2 is
greater than zero), it remains above zero for x > x∗ (Observation 4). 
Eﬀectively, Lemma 2 tells us the behavior of a convex quadratic at its “right” or larger root
x∗.
We now examine all possibilities for x∗ −N1:
2a. Case when N1 > KC and 0 ≤ x∗ −N1 < N0:
There are three equilibria.
The ﬁrst equilibrium is all ﬁrms telling the truth. If no 0 value ﬁrm is reporting 1, the
equilibrium x = N1, i.e., M = 0. Note that x∗ < 0 < x = N1 ≤ x∗. That is, x = N1 is between
the two real roots. Therefore, when evaluated at x = N1, the left hand side of equation (15) is
negative because the numerator is ≤ zero (Observation 4) and the denominator is positive at
x = N1 (i.e., (N1)
2−KN1+KN1 > 0). There is thus no beneﬁt for a 0 value ﬁrm to reporting
1 when no other 0 value ﬁrm is. In the corner case when x∗ = N1, the 0 ﬁrms are indiﬀerent,
and we assume they tell the truth. Therefore all ﬁrms tell the truth.
The second equilibrium is all 0 value ﬁrms reporting 1. Now x = N > x∗, and the left hand
side of equation (15) is positive (or zero in the corner case) because the numerator is above
zero (or zero in the corner case) due to Lemma 2 and the denominator is positive (Observation
2 applies because x = N ≥ x∗ > K). There is a positive beneﬁt for a 0 value ﬁrm to reporting
1 when all other 0 value ﬁrms are. Therefore, all ﬁrms in the economy report 1.
The third equilibrium is the knife-edge where the equilibrium M = x∗ − N1. That is, M =
x∗−N1 of the 0 value ﬁrms report 1 and the remaining 0 value ﬁrms report 0. All managers of
0 value ﬁrms earn 0 in expectation. Equation (15) as well as all the feasibility and interiority
conditions are thus satisﬁed.
Finally, note that the number of ﬁrms reporting 1 is diﬀerent in each possible equilibrium;
therefore, everyone can ascertain which equilibrium the economy is in.
2b. Case when N1 > KC and x
∗ −N1 < 0:
In this case, the minimum feasible value of x is greater than x∗, i.e., x > x∗ > K. Therefore
the left hand side of equation (15) is positive at the feasible values of x because the numerator
is positive (Lemma 2) and the denominator is positive (Observation 2 applies because x > K).
The numerator will never come back to zero as x increases all the way to N because the
quadratic equation (16) has no zeroes larger than x∗ (the only other zero x∗ is smaller than
x∗). Thus, reporting 1 is always better than reporting 0. The only equilibrium is therefore all
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ﬁrms reporting 1.
2c. Case when N1 > KC and x
∗ −N1 ≥ N0:
In this case, because x ≤ N , the feasible range of x is ≤ x∗. If x is in the range x ≤ K, the
regulator can inspect all ﬁrms and therefore M = 0. All ﬁrms report the truth.
Next consider the feasible range N ≥ x > K. Because x ≤ x∗ in this range, the left hand side
of equation (15) is negative because Lemma 2 indicates that the numerator is below zero (or
zero in the corner case). The numerator will stay below zero until x goes all the way down to
the other root x∗. That root is smaller than zero and is thus below the positive feasible range
of x. In addition, the denominator of equation (15) is positive because x > K and Observation
2 applies. Therefore, the payoﬀ for a 0 value ﬁrm for reporting 1 is strictly negative. Therefore
no 0 value ﬁrm will report 1 and all ﬁrms in the economy report the truth. In the corner case
when x∗ = N , the 0 ﬁrms are indiﬀerent; we assume that they report the truth. 
Proof of Lemma 1. The key fact is that in equilibriumK < N1+M . Therefore
K
N1+M
< 1.
Diﬀerentiating the denominator of the price function N1
N1+M− KMN1+M
with respect to M gives:
1− KN1
(N1 +M)2
= 1−
(
K
N1 +M
)(
N1
N1 +M
)
> 0
The denominator of the price function is thus increasing in M , and the overall fraction is
decreasing in M . Also note that the price function reaches its maximum value 1 when the
number of misreporting ﬁrms M reaches its lowest value 0.

Exhibit 1
Excerpts from the S.E.C’s Testimony Before The Subcommittee On Financial Services And
General Government
Chairman Mary Schapiro, March 11, 2009
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts031109mls.htm
The last year has been a wrenching time for the investors whom the SEC is charged with
protecting ...
One of my very ﬁrst actions as Chairman was to end the two-year “penalty pilot” program,
which had required the Enforcement staﬀ to obtain a special set of approvals from the Com-
mission in cases involving civil monetary penalties against public companies as punishment for
33
securities fraud ... Another change I implemented to bolster the SEC’s Enforcement program
was to provide for more rapid approval of formal orders of investigation.
It is clear that, regardless of the ultimate ﬁndings of the Inspector General, the agency needs
to improve its ability to process and pursue appropriately the more than 700,000 tips and
referrals it receives annually ... In addition, the examination staﬀs of the SEC and FINRA are
working together to identify better ways that incipient frauds might be detected at an early
stage ...
SEC Resources
Few of the initiatives I have identiﬁed can be implemented with the SEC’s existing resources.
Most of this agenda will require additional funding, particularly to rebuild the agency’s work-
force and invest in new technologies ...
The agency has suﬀered a signiﬁcant decline in staﬃng levels, due to several years of ﬂat or
declining budgets. Between 2005 and 2007, the agency lost 10 percent of its employees, a
decline that inevitably aﬀected all of the SEC’s major programs ...
Yet as the SEC staﬀ has declined, the securities markets grew dramatically. For example, since
2005 the number of investment advisers registered with the Commission has increased by 32
percent and their assets under management have jumped by over 70 percent (to now more
than $40 trillion) ... The SEC oversees more than 30,000 registrants including 12,000 public
companies, 4,600 mutual funds, 11,300 investment advisers, 600 transfer agencies, and 5,500
broker dealers. We do this with a total staﬀ of 3,600 people.
In the context of such rapidly expanding markets, I believe the recent reductions in the SEC’s
staﬀ seriously undermined the agency’s ability to eﬀectively oversee the markets and eﬀectively
pursue violations of the securities laws ...
Then, if we hope to restore the SEC as a vigorous and eﬀective regulator, I believe we must go
even further. The President is requesting a total of $1.026 billion for the agency in FY 2010,
a 9 percent increase over the FY 2009 appropriation ... It will fund an additional 50 staﬀ for
the SEC, enhance our ability to uncover and prosecute fraud, and begin to build desperately
needed technology.
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